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ABSTRACT
This paper extends the analysis of price level targeting to a model including the New-
Keynesian Phillips Curve.   We examine the inflation-output variability tradeoffs implied by
optimal inflation and price level rules.  In previous work with the Neoclassical Phillips
Curve, we found that the choice between inflation targeting and price level targeting
depended on the amount of persistence in the output gap.  That is, if the output gap was not
too persistent, or if lagged output did not enter the aggregate supply function, then inflation
targets were preferred to price level targets.  When we start with a New Keynesian Phillips
Curve, the amount of persistence in the output gap still affects the relative placement of the
inflation-output variability tradeoff.  But, contrary to the Neoclassical case, even where the
persistence of the output gap in the aggregate supply function is small or nonexistent, the
price level targeting regime still results in a more favorable tradeoff between output and
inflation variability than does an inflation-targeting regime.
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Waller for helpful discussions.In a previous paper, Dittmar et al. (1999a) used a simple Phillips Curve model and
evidence about the persistence in output gaps to show that a price-level targeting regime
would likely result in a better inflation-output variability tradeoff than an inflation-
targeting regime.   That was an extension of work by Svensson (1997).  The Phillips
Curve specification was consistent with one derived from a Lucas Island model with
persistent supply shocks or a Fischer wage-contracting model.  McCallum (1994) refers
to this as a Neoclassical Phillip Curve because it is consistent with the Natural Rate
Hypothesis (NRH)monetary policy cannot keep output permanently above its natural
rate because only unanticipated monetary policy affects real output.
Kiley (1998) argues that the Neoclassical specification is inconsistent with U.S.
data because he believes there is historical evidence that anticipated monetary policy has
had real effects.  He attributes Svensson’s (1997) favorable finding for price-level
targeting to his choice of Phillips Curve specification.  Kiley concludes that, compared to
the case with inflation targeting, price-level targeting would have been found to result in
a worse inflation-output variability tradeoff if Svensson had started with a New
Keynesian version of the Phillips Curve.   Kiley derives the expectation for the mean of
output in a New Keynesian model, shows that the expectation depends on the lagged
price level, and infers from this that trying to stabilize the price level would raise the
variability of output.  He does not derive the inflation-output variability tradeoff implied
by the model nor does he experiment with alternative policy rules using his New
Keynesian specification.
In this paper we extend the analysis of price level targeting of Dittmar et al.
(1999) to a model including the New-Keynesian Phillips curve recommended by Kiley.2
We examine the inflation-output variability tradeoffs implied by optimal inflation and
price level rules.  To be consistent with our earlier work and that of Svensson (1997), we
assume that lagged output enters the aggregate supply function.  The introduction of lags
is consistent with both the theoretical model of Taylor (1980) who includes both leads
and lags of unemployment in the Phillips Curve and the empirical work of Roberts
(1995), who finds serial correlation in the error terms of his estimated Phillips Curves.
Our intuition is that price level targeting should be preferable in a sticky-price
world where prices are costly to adjust.  If prices were perfectly flexible, alternative
monetary policy rules would have almost no effect on real output.  But in world where it
is costly to adjust prices, a policy that reduces price fluctuations would seem to be
appropriate.  Indeed, we find that the New Keynesian Phillips Curve provides even
stronger support for price level targeting than did the model with the neoclassical Phillips
Curve.
In previous work with the Neoclassical Phillips Curve, we found that the choice
between inflation targeting and price level targeting depended on the amount of
persistence in the output gap.  That is, if the output gap was not too persistent, or if
lagged output did not enter the aggregate supply function, then inflation targets were
preferred to price level targets.  However, empirical evidence showed a very high level of
persistence in the output gap, suggesting that price level targets offer the policymaker a
better menu of tradeoffs between output and inflation variability.
To preview the results in this article, we show that when we start with a New
Keynesian Phillips Curve, the amount of persistence in the output gap still affects the
relative placement of the inflation-output variability tradeoff.  But, contrary to the3
Neoclassical case, even where the persistence of the output gap in the aggregate supply
function is small or nonexistent, the price level targeting regime still results in a more
favorable tradeoff between output and inflation variability than does an inflation-
targeting regime.
In the first section we briefly describe the New Keynesian model and compare it
to the Neoclassical specification.   In the second section, we construct the inflation-output
variability curves implied by alternative parameterizations of the model.  In conclusion,
we discuss the assumptions that are apparently needed to find that price level targeting
would destabilize output.
A NEW KEYNESIAN PHILLIPS CURVE
Roberts (1995) shows that the sticky price models of Taylor (1980), Rotemberg
(1982), and Calvo (1983) all imply the same Phillips Curve structure which has been
called New Keynesian.   We begin with the same infinite-horizon, quadratic loss function
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where the superscript A refers to the loss function of an inflation targeting central bank, 
is the central bank’s discount rate, (yt) is the deviation of output from the target level and
( t
*) is the deviation of inflation from the central bank's inflation target. The term,  ,
gives the weight on output gap relative to the weight on inflation in the central bank's loss
function.
The Neoclassical Phillips Curve used in our earlier paper is given by4
yy tt t t t
e
t =+− + −− ρα ππ ε 11 () ,
where  determines the persistence in the output gap,   determines the response of the
output gap to unanticipated inflation, and  t is an i.i.d. technology shock with mean zero
and variance σ ε
2.   We are making no distinction between the aggregate supply function
and the Phillips Curve.
1
Kiley (1999) uses the Calvo (1983) model to derive the following New Keynesian
Phillips Curve:
yy tt t t t
e
t =+−+ −+ ρα π π ε 11 () .
This is deceptively similar to the Neoclassical version where the anticipated inflation that
enters the function is the expectation for period t+1 rather than t.   Kiley includes a
discussion of the empirical support for this specification and a discussion of the research
that has developed microeconomic foundations for this aggregate relationship.  A
comprehensive survey of the implications for monetary policy implied by New
Keynesian theories can be found in Clarida et al. (1999).
To solve this model, we must decide what to assume about how the central bank
takes account of its effect on inflation expectations.  Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed
that the presence of forward-looking expectations in the central bank’s Phillips curve
constraint causes a problem of time inconsistency if the bank tries to manipulate those
expectations.  To avoid this time-consistency problem, we assume that the central bank
takes inflation expectations as given.  Recent discussion of this issue can be found in
Woodford (1999) and Clarida et al. (1999).  To explain our decision to treat expectations as
                                                
1 Some would call our equation an aggregate supply function because the dependent variable is the output
gap.  If the equation were rearranged with inflation on the left-hand side, they would call it a Phillips5
given, consider what happens if we do not.  We review the time-consistency issue within
the optimization problem faced by our inflation-targeting central bank.  To solve the
constrained optimization problem at time t, we form the Lagrangian as:
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t
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where the t’s are a sequence of random multipliers and the term π ti ++ 1 has replaced
π ti
e
++ 1in the Phillips Curve constraint because the central bank treats the expectations of
the future inflation as a choice variable.  Note that the first order condition when taken
with respect to  t is given by
20 ππ α µ tt −+ =
* . 	

Since the bank is trying to optimize by influencing expectations, the first order condition
taken with respect to  t+1 takes the form,
20 11 βπ π α µβ α µ EE tt t t t ++ −+ + =
* , 	

which is different from that for  t.  If the bank were to re-optimize at time t+1, it will re-
derive a first order condition for  t+1 that mirrors the one derived for  t at time t, yet is
distinct from that derived for  t+1 at time t.  Since the first order conditions derived at any
time characterize the bank's optimal policy, the bank's chosen policy at time t will be found
sub-optimal at time t+1, hence the time inconsistency.  As is well understood, without some
mechanism to commit at time t, the bank will be tempted to re-optimize, renege on any
decisions made at time t, and derive a new policy at time t+1.
                                                                                                                                                
Curve.  King and Watson (1994) show that this distinction can be important when estimating the
parameters from historical data, but it does not matter in our analytical work.6
Intuitively, the problem of time inconsistency here results from the ability of a bank
facing a New Keynesian Phillips Curve to derive rewards today by creating expectations
for tomorrow.  When a new period arrives, the temptation is to confound expectations with
new policy since the gains from the previously announced policy have already been taken.
In equilibrium, the central bank cannot benefit from reneging on announced policies.  If the
bank re-optimizes each period, or even only occasionally, then private agents will learn that
the bank’s announced future policy will not necessarily be implemented.  When this occurs,
the bank’s ability to control expectations will be lost.  To avoid this time inconsistency
problem, we assume that the central bank takes private sector expectations as given.  Under
this assumption, the bank, recognizing that it may be unable to commit to policy
announcements, forgoes any attempt to manipulate private expectations.
When the bank regards expectations as given, the bank’s optimization problem
becomes a standard one, with a quadratic objective and linear constraints.  Furthermore,
first order conditions take a standard form for all time periods, assuring policy rules are
time consistent.  Linear decision rules can be conjectured for the bank’s optimal policy.
Upon substituting the conjectured linear rules into the first order conditions for the bank’s
optimization problem, we equate coefficients on the variables in the decision rules and
derive the bank’s policy function.  We assume that the bank, in taking expectations as
given, bases its time t decisions on current states, yt-1 and  t, in both regimes and pt-1 in the
case of a price-level-targeting regime.  Expectations are then assumed to be formed as a
rational consequence of the bank’s policy rule.
It is much simpler to derive policy rules under an inflation targeting regime.  The
derivation of these rules closely follows the derivation in the appendix of Dittmar et al.7
(1999).   The bank’s optimization problem is the same as shown above except the inflation
expectations are no longer treated as a decision variable by the central bank.  The
Lagrangian is given as:
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 t’s being a sequence of random multipliers and t+i
e
t+i+1 denotes the private
sector’s inflation expectations.  First-order conditions for the bank take the form:
20 1 λ µ β ρ µ yE tt t t −+ = +
when taken with respect to the sequence of yt’s, and the form:
20 ππ α µ tt −+ =
* 	

when taken with respect to the sequence of  t’s.  Eliminating the multipliers from these












Here the central bank wants to smooth inflation deviations from target with an adjustment
for the current output gap.   If there is no persistence in the output gap, then the desired
inflation deviations today depend only on the output gap.
We now seek a linear decision rule for inflation of the form:
π ε tt t AA y A =+ + − 12 13 .
Expectations of the private sector are assumed to be rational, so at time t we have:
π t
e
t AA y + =+ 112 .
Substituting these expressions into the Phillips’ curve equation and solving the resulting































Decision rules are invariant so we can determine  t+1 by iterating on the rule for  t to yield
the following expression:































Taking time t expectations then yields a linear expression for Et  t+1.  If we now substitute
the expressions for yt t, and  t+1 into the first order condition and equate constant terms
and coefficients on yt-1 and  t, we obtain three equations that can be solved for the
unknown A1, A2, and A3.
To obtain our solution, we assume that the central bank takes inflation
expectations as given.  Under this assumption, the Euler equations for the inflation
targeting case are of the same form for both the New Keynesian and Neoclassical
specifications of the Phillips Curve.  However, the different Phillips Curve specifications
lead to different monetary policy rules.  In the New Keynesian case, agents’ inflation
expectations at time t are for inflation at time t+1 and involve yt, whereas in the
Neoclassical case, inflation expectations at time t are for inflation at time t and involve
only yt-1.
Figure 1 shows the inflation-output variability tradeoffs for the Neoclassical and
New Keynesian cases when the central bank has an inflation target.  We graphically
display the inflation/output variability tradeoffs in the two specifications by first expressing
the output gap variance and the inflation variance as functions of the preference parameter
λ  while holding the parameters of the Phillips’ curve constant.  For a given λ , the bank’s9
decision rules can be used to calculate an unconditional variance for both inflation and the
output gap (a single point in Figure 1). Varying the bank’s preferences by varying λ  will
determine the location of the curve representing the trade off between σ π
2 and σ y
2.
The parameterizations used here are the same as the ones used by Dittmar et al.
(1999a):  = 0.5,  = 0.99, and  = 0.9. These assumptions imply a Phillips Curve slope
of 0.2 when the Phillips Curve is written in terms of the inflation rate.  Using this form,
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) estimate the slope to be 0.14, and Orphanides (1998)
estimates the slope to be .18 with a standard error of 0.07.  We assume that the interest
rate is 4 percent at an annual rate, so the quarterly discount factor is approximately 0.99.
As the Figure 1 shows, the tradeoff is similar across the two model specifications
except for extreme cases where the central bank puts little weight on the deviation of
inflation from target.  In the Neoclassical case, the variance of inflation rises
monotonically with , the relative weight the central bank puts on the output gap in its
loss function.  In the New Keynesian case, with this parameterization, the curve bends
back; that is, inflation variability begins to decline after  goes above 3.  It changes
direction again at very high values of .  We do not have any intuition about why this
curve is oddly shaped when the central bank puts high weight on reducing variability of
the output gap.  Note, however, Cecchetti, McConnell and Quiros (1999) estimated  to
be less than .33 (by our definition of ) for the countries in the European Monetary
Union.
The interesting question is what happens when the central bank targets the price
level instead of the inflation rate.  Now, the problem becomes more complicated.  We
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where the price level, p, has replaced the inflation rate and the superscript B denotes a
Loss function in the price level rather than the inflation rate.
Determining decision rules for the bank in the case of price-level targeting proceeds
in a similar manner as in the case of inflation targeting, but is complicated by the presence
of two lagged state variables in the banks Phillips’ curve, yt-1 and pt-1.  The bank’s first order
condition in this case will involve infinite sums of future price levels and output gaps.  To
simplify the derivation of these conditions, we first define the new variable  ~ .
* ppp ttt =−
The New Keynesian Phillips curve will take the form:
yy pp p tt t t t
e
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in the transformed price variable.  We can now form the bank’s Lagrangian as:
Ey p y y p p p t
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with, once again, the  t’s being a sequence of random multipliers.  First order conditions
now take the form
20 1 λ µ β ρ µ yE tt t t −+ = +
when taken with respect to the sequence of yt’s and
22 0 1
~ pE ttt t ++ = + α µ βα µ
when taken with respect to the sequence of pt’s.
We have found the simplest way to eliminate multipliers from the bank’s first order
conditions is to regard both sequences above as linear systems in the unknown multipliers.
The sequence of first order conditions derived as a result of differentiating the Lagrangian
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Thus, we can conclude from the first set of first order conditions that
EE y tt i
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for i = 0,...,∞ , and we can conclude from the second set that
EE p tt i
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for i = 0,...,∞ .  Equating the two expressions for the unknown multipliers gives the





















Calculating decision rules for the bank now proceeds in a similar manner to the
calculation of decision rules for a inflation targeting central bank.  When decisions are
made at time t, the bank’s state variables are  yp tt t −− 11 ,
~ , and ε .  We conjecture linear
decision rules of the form  Bp By B tt t 11 21 3  + + ~
−−   ε for yt and  Ap Ay A tt t 11 21 3  + + ~
−−   ε for  ~ . pt
Using the rational expectations condition,  ~~ pA p A y t
e
tt + =  11 2   +   and the Phillips curve
equation allows us to relate the coefficients of the decision rule for yt to those in the rule for
 ~ . pt   Iterating these decision rules forward and taking expectations allows us to write both
Ep Ey tt n tt n
~
++  and  as a linear function of  yp tt t −− 11 ,
~ , and ε .  In general, we have
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Since this is a linear difference equation in  AB i
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expressed as algebraic functions of the unknown decision rule parameters A1, A2, B1, and
B2.  With this representation we can substitute into the first order condition, explicitly sum
the resulting geometric series on the supposition that both  1 and  2 are less than 1 in
absolute value, and finally equate coefficients on state variables.  We have found the
resulting equations for the coefficients in the decision rules to be too algebraically complex
to admit a closed form solution.  However, we have solved them numerically for a range of
parameters.  We found that both roots,  1 and  2, were real and inside the unit circle.  We
then calculated the inflation-output tradeoff implied by varying , the bank’s relative
preference for output stability, between zero and infinity.
Figure 2 shows that the inflation-output variability tradeoffs are almost identical
for the two versions of the Phillips Curve when there is a high degree of persistence in
the output gap.  We are not really interested in distinguishing between these alternative
views of the Phillips Curve.  We want to respond to the suggestion that price level
targeting would not work well under the New Keynesian Specification.  Figures 3
through 5 show the inflation-output variability tradeoffs implied by the New Keynesian
specification for three alternative values of , our measure of persistence in the output
gap.  The first case compares inflation targeting with price level targeting for what we
believe is a realistic amount of persistence,  = 0.9 (see Figure 3).  The price level target
results in a better inflation-output variability tradeoff than does an inflation target.  Figure
4 shows that price level targeting still dominates inflation targeting when  = 0.5.  In the
Neoclassical case, the tradeoffs were identical in this case.  As  falls below 0.5, the14
inflation target dominated the price level target in our earlier analysis.  In contrast, Figure
5 shows that, under the New Keynesian specification, inflation targeting results in a
worse tradeoff between inflation and output variability even when  = 0.
In summary, Dittmar et al. (1999), assuming a Neoclassical Phillips Curve, found
that price level targeting dominated inflation targeting for cases where the output gap was
relatively persistent; that is, when  > 0.5.  In this article, we find that when we use a
New Keynesian Phillips Curve, price level targeting always dominates inflation targeting,
even if we omit the lagged output gap from the aggregate supply function.
IT’S NOT THE PHILLIPS CURVE, IT’S EXPECTATIONS FORMATION
This raises an important issue.  Simulations of econometric models typically find
that targeting the price level is a bad idea.  Economists have attributed this result to the
presence of nominal rigidities such as wage contracts or price adjustment costs.  Yet in
these econometric experiments, it is also true that inflation expectations are almost
always considered to be formed adaptively.   For example, Haldane and Salmon (1995)
use a small econometric model with adaptive inflation expectations to examine whether
monetary policy targets for price stability should be expressed in levels or rates of
change.  They find that price level targeting results in higher short-run variability for both
inflation and output growth.  These results are typical of econometric model simulations
with backward-looking expectations (See Haldane and Salmon for references).
There are at least two examples where central bank economists conducted
experiments with price level targets using econometric models modified to include some
forward-looking behavior.  Black, Macklem, and Rose (1997) look at combination rules15
that combine a long-term price level objective with a short-term inflation targeting rule.
The presence of an error-correction term guarantees the eventual return of the price level
to its long-run target path.  For some values of the error correction parameter between 0.1
and 0.125, they derive an inflation-output variability tradeoff that is better than with the
inflation rule alone.  Using a policy model estimated at the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Williams (1999) finds “iInterestingly, targeting the price level
rather than the inflation rate generates little additional cost in terms of output and
inflation variability. Under price level targeting, the expectations channel helps stabilize
inflation, thereby eliminating much of the output stabilization costs that would otherwise
be associated with reversing deviations of the price level from its target.”  Williams
confirms our view that the reason that price level targeting fares so badly in econometric
simulations is that this is exactly the type of exercise for which the Lucas Critique is
likely to be most relevant.  The policy rules that were most efficient in reducing inflation
and output variability when the model assumes forward-looking expectations, turn out to
be the worst when fixed adaptive expectations are assumed.  And vice-versa, policies that
are efficient when expectations are assumed to be adaptive do poorly when expectations
are forward looking.  Assumptions about expectations are critical for the analysis.
We focus on an extreme comparison in our analysis, inflation targeting versus
price level targeting.  Our results suggest that targeting the price level in the short run
may work better than previously thought.  But these results should be put into
perspective.  We do not have enough confidence in the short-run dynamics of economy to
recommend that any central bank adopt a policy rule that would represent a sharp break
with current practice.  Rather, the role of the price level target is to provide a long-term16
anchor for the monetary system.  Dittmar et al. (1999b) showed that a central bank can
dramatically reduce the uncertainty about inflation inherent in an inflation-targeting
regime by 1) adopting a long-term price level objective, and 2) using it in an error-
correction framework to modify the short-run inflation targets.   That analysis was based
on an aggregate model including the Neoclassical Phillips Curve.  But as we have shown
here, the results would not be substantially different if we had started with a New
Keynesian specification.17
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Figure 1:  Inflation-Output Variability Tradeoffs
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Figure 2:  Inflation-Output Variability Tradeoffs
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Figure 3:  Inflation-Output Variability Tradeoffs
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Figure 4:  Inflation-Output Variability Tradeoffs
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Figure 5:  Inflation-Output Variability Tradeoffs
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